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Kettering demolishes the legend that Luynes was
low-born. He came from a solidly respectable family of
the sword nobility in the Midi which had served the
crown militarily for two centuries. Although badly ed-
ucated, he was not stupid, but “an intelligent, ambitious
realist who had spent his life at court and knew how it
operated” (p. 51). According to Kettering, he was “no
greedier or more ambitious than other courtiers” (p.
103). His documented fortune at his death was no larger
than that of many other royal favorites. Nor was his cli-
entele excessively large by great nobles’ standards. By
skillful manipulation of the court nobility the duke
helped to defeat the Queen Mother, winning the re-
spect of the great nobles at no financial cost to the
crown. As Keeper of the Seals, he could preside over
the king’s council, but, if Kettering is right, his influence
over decision making, though significant, was not par-
amount, for he always deferred to the king’s wishes.
“His was a voice of caution in the inner circle of the king
who loved to play soldiers . . . He was a self-proclaimed
peacemaker and moderate who regularly consulted the
conservative greybeards” (p. 176). Kettering admits
that as a Constable lacking military experience he was
a failure and contributed to the debacle that was the
siege of Montauban. She devotes a whole chapter to an
examination of the bulky pamphlet literature that at-
tacked Luynes as well as his own response to it that
historians have largely ignored. She concludes that his
historical importance has been overlooked “because
Richelieu’s dislike of him has dominated historical lit-
erature” (p. 237).
At times the reader may feel that Kettering is guilty
of special pleading. Where evidence is lacking or con-
fused, she tends to give her hero the benefit of the
doubt. Her thematic approach to his ministerial career
also leads to repetitiveness. These are minor blemishes,
however, in a book that is both scholarly and lucid.
While doing justice to an unfairly neglected historical
figure, it adds significantly to our knowledge of power
politics at the court of France on the eve of Richelieu’s
rise to power.
ROBERT KNECHT
University of Birmingham
ZOE¨ A. SCHNEIDER. The King’s Bench: Bailiwick Magis-
trates and Local Governance in Normandy, 1670–1740.
(Changing Perspectives on Early Modern Europe,
number 11.) Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester
Press. 2008. Pp. xii, 326. $75.00.
Although it is a commonplace to say that the “absolute”
monarchy in France was not all that absolute, more re-
search has been needed to explain how the state actu-
ally functioned at the local level. Through a rich and
detailed study of bailiwick jurisdictions (bailliages), the
lowest level of royal courts, Zoe¨ A. Schneider offers an
illuminating perspective on this problem. According to
Schneider, bailiwick judges operated with a great deal
of independence and performed critical services that
gave them a position similar in many respects to English
Justices of the Peace. Unlike their English counter-
parts, however, the Norman bailiwick magistrates were
not integrated into a larger national political system,
because both the provincial estates of Normandy and
the Estates General, which could have provided this
link, had been eliminated.
The system in Normandy that developed under the
French monarchy ended up being both functional and
dysfunctional. The courts provided order, justice, and
security necessary for safeguarding the family and its
property, but the royal government also sold far too
many offices, milked officeholders for money, and, ex-
cept when taxes were at stake, left local judges to their
own devices. Despite the problems created by the
crown, the bailiwick magistrates formed, for the most
part, a competent, professional group, albeit one some-
what disillusioned by royal policies. Thus, when the
French Revolution came, they were poised to attack the
abuses of the old system but came through the upheaval
with their position as judges largely intact in the new
regime.
Schneider’s careful, archivally based research offers
numerous insights on the relationship between the
French crown and local law and governance. Perhaps
most important is the scope of legislative sovereignty.
Legislative sovereignty—that is, the supreme right of
the king to impose his law on subjects without their con-
sent—has been central to the definition of absolute
monarchy. Schneider persuasively argues, however,
that customary law, which regulated property and fam-
ily relations, always remained largely outside the con-
trol of the king’s sovereign claims. Bailiwick magistrates
retained a great deal of legal independence because
most cases tried in their courts fell under Norman cus-
tomary law and concerned disputes about property and
family affairs. Early in its history the monarchy had
been happy to codify local custom and leave its enforce-
ment in the hands of local judges; it really had no al-
ternative. By the end of the Old Regime, however, the
grip of the parlements and bailiwicks over customary
law prevented the crown from reforming an ossifying
legal system.
Because the monarchy saw the royal court system at
all levels as a way to raise money through the sale of
offices and additional expedients, local magistrates had
to make the system work for them. Facing inadequate
financial returns from a single office, successful mag-
istrates ended up acquiring multiple offices in different
sectors of local government including the town council,
lower-level tax courts, seigneurial courts, and inten-
dants’ subdelegacies. Viewed from above, the system of
offices looked fragmented, but underneath the accumu-
lation of offices meant that a small group of well-to-do
landowners basically ended up running local affairs and
enjoying a good return on their investment.
Although local notables turned the system to their
advantage, custom did accord some protections for the
poor, including a kind of citizen’s arrest. Another as-
pect of Norman customary law was male primogeniture,
which discriminated against women and younger broth-
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ers, but families often used other provisions of the law
to mitigate its effects. Thus Schneider paints a picture
in which the legal system was not simply applied top
down to situations but was consciously used by individ-
uals in the attempt to create favorable outcomes.
Overall, Schneider presents local magistrates as in-
dependent, resourceful, and prosperous and portrays
Norman customary law as having useful and flexible
features. Several questions arise from this depiction.
First, Norman custom was used to litigate all manner of
issues dealing with family and property, yet Schneider
also argues that it was ossifying and creating a kind of
legal straitjacket by the end of the Old Regime. In what
respects can it be said that this fossilization was occur-
ring? Second, if some local magistrates served as sub-
delegates of the royal intendants, were all of the mag-
istrates so cut off from the attention of the crown?
Finally, if entrepreneurial magistrates succeeded in
making the system work, then why did so many of them
turn so decisively against the system in 1789? Schneider
suggests some reasons, but the problematic aspects of
the system could be probed more fully. In some ways,
these questions arise from the richness and complexity
of Schneider’s research and do not detract from its ac-
complishments. All in all, her book is a welcome con-
tribution to literature on how the not-so-absolute mon-
archy actually worked at the grassroots level during the
reign of the Sun King and his successors.
GAIL BOSSENGA
College of William and Mary
GREGORY S. BROWN. Literary Sociability and Literary
Property in France, 1775–1793: Beaumarchais, the So-
cie´te´ des auteurs dramatiques and the Come´die Fran-
c¸aise. (Studies in European Cultural Transition, num-
ber 33.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company.
2006. Pp. x, 186. $100.00.
Gregory S. Brown has written a book about a very subtle
matter, the changing yet steady role of the Socie´te´ des
auteurs dramatiques (SAD) in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century. Although Pierre-Augustin Caron
de Beaumarchais is the central figure in this story, it
really concerns an entire group of playwrights who saw
themselves as superior to commercial writers and who
practiced a particular kind of literary sociability. Far
from wanting to defend themselves against the Come´-
die Franc¸aise, the royal theater that performed their
plays, the members of the SAD took pride in their re-
lationship with it; they sought to enhance their pay and
prestige, their control over their literary productions,
without endangering the ties that bound them to the
actors and courtiers who controlled the troupe. Yet
they did have grievances. How to negotiate this terrain
and get the desired results without jeopardizing their
special connections? This was a delicate game, one for
which the nimble and savvy Beaumarchais seemed ide-
ally suited. Admired yet somewhat feared at court as a
devastating pamphleteer, and highly regarded by his
author colleagues, he straddled the two worlds and
sought to better the situation of writers without threat-
ening the particular kind of patronage to which the
SAD authors had become accustomed. He cultivated
his several important court connections, like the Prince
de Conti and Jean-Fre´de´ric Phe´lypeaux de Maurepas,
but never lost his popularity with his public. Indeed,
there is a sense in which Beaumarchais was always per-
forming.
Historiographically this book is quite unique, as
Brown himself points out: its portrayal of Beaumar-
chais is more nuanced than that in most biographies.
Also, previous books on the Come´die Franc¸aise depict
the SAD as much more radical than it really was, and
have told this story as an overt, polarizing conflict. The
group did indeed fight for literary property rights, but
not as a dissident faction. Rather, SAD recognized the
fresh, reforming flavor of the young Louis XVI’s court,
and picked up on the sense of possibilities for change
with a new king barely beyond his teenage years. These
writers were civil and genteel and wanted above all else
to preserve the specialness of their professional iden-
tity. Brown is at great pains to show that his method of
analyzing the ways this particular group of intellectuals
conceived of themselves and their position is different
and better than those who have so far studied the the-
ater of the French Enlightenment. There is a lot of blur-
ring of categories and a refusal of binaries in Brown’s
analysis, a critique of oversimplification. SAD authors
were not grasping and commodity-minded, as other
scholars have suggested, but rather appreciative and
mindful of the particular contribution they made to the
social order as responsible and tasteful educators of a
broad audience. Brown arrives at these conclusions by
closely studying the language and rhetorical strategies
of the SAD writers.
It was their hope to work within the hierarchical
framework of the Old Regime. They were civil and po-
lite. Those more noisy and critical playwrights, like
Louis-Se´bastien Mercier, were excluded from the SAD
because they frontally attacked the actors. And yet,
Beaumarchais understood the energy and vigor of some
of the aggressive outsiders, and he actually effected a
rapprochement between Mercier and the powerful Duc
de Duras that gave Mercier more prominence, making
possible his transformation into a successful author
later in his career. Even within the SAD, some of the
more disgruntled and less controllable members advo-
cated the formation of alternative theaters, of at least
a “second troupe.” Beaumarchais acknowledged them
but reined them in to safeguard the position of the man
of letters within the elite establishment.
This balance was too delicate, however, the arrange-
ment too fragile to last. In the 1780s Beaumarchais him-
self became disenchanted with the tameness of the SAD
and grew angry at the Come´die. Consequently he was
accused of being mercenary and unsociable, and the
connection of literati to the court weakened. Later, in
1791, the fraught and deteriorating relations between
the SAD and the Come´die were represented as a fierce
fight between a despotic theatre on the one hand, and
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